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1 
 
Akrasia – Status of Weak-Willed Actions in Philosophy of Law 
 
Abstract:  Akrasia,  or  weak-will,  is  a  term  denoting  a  phenomenon  when  one  acts  freely  and 
intentionally contrary to his or her better judgment. Discussion of akrasia originates in the Plato's 
Protagoras where he states that “No one who either knows or believes that there is another possible 
course  of  action,  better  than  the  one  he  is following,  will ever  continue  on his  present  course”. 
However, in his influential article from 1970, Donald Davidson argued that akrasia is theoretically 
possible yet irrational. Some other critics of Plato's stance point out that phenomenon of akrasia is 
common in our everyday experience, therefore it must be possible.  
These two arguments in favor of akrasia existence – theoretical and empirical – will be discussed 
from both – philosophical and psychological points of view. Especially, George Ainslie's argument 
that akrasia results from hyperbolic discounting will be taken into consideration to show how it affects 
traditional thinking about weak-willed actions. 
Finally, the paper will discuss how the contemporary notion of akrasia may affect the idea of 
responsibility and free will. Implications for the philosophy of law will be shown, i.a. whether  it is 
possible to claim that a given example of a weak-willed action was indeed free and intentional and 
one should be held responsible for its results. 
Keywords: akrasia,weak-willed actions, discounting,  
 
I. Definition and History of the Concept 
1. Short Introduction – Procrastination 
How many times have we experienced a situation when, despite having to write an article or a 
paper for a conference, instead of doing so we firstly cleaned up the room perfectly, did the 
washing-up, checked all the latest news on the Internet, found suddenly time to answer all the 
forgotten emails etc. Of course, while carving the pencils for God-knows which time we are 
perfectly aware that we should be doing our work instead. This is the case of procrastination, 
the nightmare of all the students when the exams are coming, the „venerable sin of sloth” as 
G. Ainslie puts it (2008). He defines it also more precisely: „by procrastinating you choose a 
course that you would avoid if you chose from a different vantage point, either from some 
time in advance or in retrospect” (ibidem). 
Procrastination  is  a  form  of  akrasia  or  a  weak-willed  action  –  done  freely  and 
intentionally against one's better judgment. In this  paper I want to discuss the notion, possible 
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explanation (from theoretical and empirical point of view) and eventually consequences of 
this phenomenon – in the philosophy of law. I will discuss three consequences:  
 
a)  for the assumption of homo oeconomicus as used in the economic analysis of law; 
b)  for the assumption that free market maximizes expected income most efficiently; 
c)  eventually – agent responsibility for a breach of legal rules. 
 
These are not all the possible consequences of akrasia for the philosophy of law, but I will 
focus only on them. Now, I will begin with a brief  historical introduction. 
 
2. Plato 
The problem of akrasia originates from Plato's Protagoras [358c] where Socrates argues:  
 
“Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who knows or believes there is something  else better 
than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he 
could be doing what is better. To give in to oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and to 
control oneself is nothing other than wisdom.”  
 
Therefore, for Plato, akrasia is impossible [let me call this approach a Socratic stance]. Had 
one believed that something is better for him – he would have done it. For Socrates (and 
Plato) akrasia is simply ignorance.  
 
3. Aristotle 
On  the  other  hand,  Aristotle  argues  in  his  Nicomachean  Ethics  that  akrasia  is  actually 
possible  and  quite  common  in  our  everyday  experience.  This  comes  from  an  intuitive 
observation  that  everyone  from  time  to  time  is  subject  to  passion  (pathos)  which  does 
contradict the reason. People who tend to act according to their passions are called acratic, 
while these who would rather follow their reason – are called encratic.  
Actually,  Aristotle  enumerates  two  types  of  akrasia  –  propeteia  [impetuosity]  and 
astheneia [weakness]. He also talks about two appetites that are the passions that may cause 
akrasia  –  pleasure  and  anger.  If  we  now  put  the  two  types  of  akrasia  in  raws  and  two 
appetites in columns – we will receive 4 forms of akrasia. Two of them, caused by pleasure, 
would be “standard” akrasia while the two remaining “qualified” – anger caused akrasia. 
For Aristotle, akrasia would be a result of conflict between emotion and reason, or to be 
more precise – a conflict between reason limited by emotion and reason free of emotion 
impact. This is important because, although there are some different opinions (Austin, 1956/7 3 
[in:] Stroud, 2008), I think that for Aristotle the case of akrasia was not absolutely exclusive 
of person self-control. 
These two positions – Socratic, which doubts the possibility of akrasia and Aristotelian, 
which tries to explain the common intuition of possibility of acting against one's reason – are 
fundamental for the ongoing discussion. However, the problem was given much attention in 
the history of philosophy. Historical introduction can be found in Bobonich, Destree (2007) or 
Thero (2006). 
 
4. Contemporary Definition of the Concept 
The aim of this paper is to discuss akrasia theoretically and empirically. I will focus on R. 
Hare and D. Davidson explanations of weak-willed actions from the philosophical point of 
view. As per psychological explanation – I will address G. Ainslie idea, that akrasia is a 
result of hyperbolic discounting. 
 
W. Załuski (2010) suggests three forms of Akrasia: 
 
  akrasia  sensu  stricto  –  refers  to  acting  non-compulsively  against  one’s  better 
judgment. This refers to a situation when an agent
2 did x rather than y at time t even 
though she was convinced at t that, all things considered, x was a better thing to do 
and she was able to do x (which implies that she did not act compulsively). 
  akrasia sensu largo – refers to akrasia sensu stricto as well as acting compulsively 
against one’s better judgement. 
  akrasia  sensu  largissimo  -  akrasia  sensu  largissimo  “embraces  the  two  preceding 
forms of akrasia as well as the failure by an agent to realize her resolutions due to her 
natural inclinations which the resolutions were supposed to counteract (Załuski, 2010). 
 
Akrasia sensu largo can be therefore further divided into compulsive akrasia sensu largo (or 
simply  compulsive  akrasia)  and  non-compulsive  akrasia  sensu  largo  (or  simply  non-
compulsive akrasia). 
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II. Theoretical Approach 
1. Richard M. Hare 
A contemporary Socratic stance is present in the works of Richard M. Hare who argues that 
akrasia  is  indeed  impossible.  He  states  that  it  is  impossible  for  a  human  being  to  do 
something  and  at  the  same  time  truly  and  correctly  claim  that  he  ought  instead  to  do 
something else. Hare's thinking about weak-willed actions mirrors his theory of evaluative 
judgments,  which  for  him  must  be  differentiated  from  descriptive  judgments.  Evaluative 
judgments, he says, are strongly connected with the actions in a way that they  (judgments) 
“guide”  them  (actions).  According  to  Hare,  evaluative  judgments  entail  an  answer  to  the 
question “what shall I do?” and, therefore, constitute an order or imperative such as “let me 
do x”. 
For Hare, if we have a judgment, such as: (J) “I ought to do x”; and an imperative (I) “let 
me do x” - (J) entails (I) in a way that assenting to (J) requires assenting to (I) otherwise one 
cannot  claim  that  he  correctly  assented  to  J.  Therefore,  true  assenting  to  the  statement J 
requires doing the thing the imperative in question addresses.  
This means that for Hare the true evaluative judgment the given person holds can be 
drawn most reliably from the actions and choices of that person. From what the person does 
we  can  elicit  what  she  thinks,  what  are  the  moral  rules  she  follows  and  what  are  the 
preferences of that person. Actually, to be precise, Hare claims that if A did x at time t, it 
means that A valued x at time t the highest. 
For Hare ”It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a … command 
addressed  to  ourselves,  and  at  the  same  time  not  perform  it,  if  now  is  the  occasion  for 
performing it and it is in our (physical and psychological) power to do so.” 
For Hare situations described as acratic are in fact those when a person cannot do what 
he or she wants or when he or she does not truly think that he or she ought to do the thing in 
question. 
 
2. Donald Davidson 
Despite the fact, that akrasia seems logically implausible, it is difficult to deny its existence. 
It simply happens too often – whether in form of procrastination or some impulsive actions 
we later regret but on the spur of the moment they seemed much more attractive. The question 
is what weak-willed actions really are. 5 
In 1970, in his influential paper, Donald Davidson defended the possibility of akrasia. 
However, he perceived the “paradox” of weak-willed actions as the problem of philosophy of 
action – not moral philosophy.  
Accordingly, he rather uses the term “incontinence” (instead of akrasia) defining it as 
follows: 
 
In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: 
1) the agent does x intentionally; 
2) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and 
3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x. 
 
There seems to be a contradiction between 1) and 3). However, to the contrary, Davidson 
discusses how it is possible for a person to act freely and intentionally against  her better 
judgment
3. His argumentation is as follows: 
 
For Davidson there is a very important difference between two sentences: 
S1) A does x, although he finds y a better option 
S2) A does x, although he finds y a better option all things considered 
 
Let us consider two judgments: 
 
J1) x is better than y   
J2) Because of r, x is prima facie a better option than y 
   
J2 does not suggest that x is absolutely better than y – as J1 does. In case of e.g. s 
(instead of r) – y might be a better option. 
 
We can therefore extend the judgment J2:  
 
J3) because of r1, r2, r3... rx – x is prima facie a better option than y;  
or: because of (r1...rx) – x is prima facie a better option than y.  
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Even if we consider now r as (r1...rx), so that J2=J3, still J2 is not identical with J1. This is 
because  J2  is  a  relational  clause  –  and  as  such  it  cannot  conflict  logically  with  any 
unconditional judgments. So if we move back to compare sentences S1 and S2... 
 
S1) A does x, although he finds y a better option 
S2) A does x, although he finds y a better option all things considered 
 
...we can see that S2 is a relational sentence – not an all-out sentence like S1. Logically, 
hence, you may claim that you judge that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than 
to do x and yet do x intentionally, even if you could freely choose between x and y.  
 
This means that for Davidson akrasia is possible, yet irrational. It is logically possible that 
you act against your better judgment. However, acting rationally requires that you accept the 
rule of  continence  –  saying that one should act  according to  the option seen  as  the best 
considering all the available information you find relevant or as Davidson puts it “perform the 
action judged best on the basis of all available relevant reasons” (Davidson, 1970). 
If Davidson is right (and he seems to be), it is theoretically possible to act against one's 
better judgment. There is, however, a controversy about his argument. What Davidson tries to 
do is prove that akrasia sensu stricto is logically possible. The question is, is this what his 
argument  is  really  about?  In  fact,  what  Davidson  does,  is  make  us  think  that  in  akratic 
situations  we  prefer  one  thing  conditionally  and  the  other  one  unconditionally.  For 
Davidson’s argumentation to be plausible, it should be the case that what we prefer more is a 
conditional preference and what we prefer less is an unconditional one.  
It seems reasonable to agree that our preference scale is hierarchical and we prefer one 
thing over another, but yet a third thing to the first. This way our preferences are indeed 
conditional. But it is rather preposterous to claim that what we find less attractive in the first 
place is an unconditional preference overall. In fact, when Davidson suggests that A prefers x 
all things considered, then y must be in fact an option already considered (sic!).  
Davidson’s presuppositions are artificial; what he tries to do is prove that akrasia sensu 
stricto is logically possible, but in order to do so he added some additional presuppositions 
that change the initial definition of akrasia sensu stricto. This alteration seems unjustified.  
The main conclusion drawn from the theoretical part of the argument is that there is, I 
believe,  a  general  agreement  that  akrasia  sensu  stricto  is  impossible.  No  one  has  so  far 7 
managed  to  prove  it  and  it  seems  rather  impossible.  Nonetheless,  no  one  has  denied  the 
possibility of compulsive akrasia, which strikes one as a rather common phenomenon. 
.    
III. Psychological Approach 
1. Psychology of Akrasia 
If this is possible not to act according to our better judgment and indeed, already described 
cases of e.g. procrastination (well-known from our everyday experience) suggest that this 
often happens - why do we actually happen not to do what we consider rational? Utility 
theory, for instance, would suggest that we ought to maximize expected income. It encounters 
certain problems explaining why people in cases of akrasia seem to fail to do so. Therefore, 
actual existence of the phenomenon, which is interpreted as a sign of irrationality of human 
behavior not only by Davidson, but by utility theorists as well, proves again that we are not 
rational homines oeconomici. 
But  let's  take  a  closer  look  at  the  psychological  aspect  of  the  weak-willed  actions, 
considering some ideas usually connected with casual agency (Wegner, 2002) like plans and 
intentions. Let's imagine that I am on a diet. I have a long-term goal to loose some weight. In 
that case I have a plan to loose some weight which probably involves some exercise, no cakes 
etc. I also intend not to eat any cakes.  Our actions to be perceived as truly ours, that is 
consciously willed, require conscious intention as well –  if I honestly intend to do something 
I will do it if only it is possible.  
It so happens that on my way home I go past a bakery and smell the strawberry cake. I 
cannot resist (although I still find my actions free) and enter the bakery to buy a cake – which 
I then eat on-the-spot. I felt my action as intentional as well. If someone asked me 10 minutes 
earlier, I would undoubtedly claim that my intention was no to eat a cake on my way home. In 
fact, that was really my intention, I consciously decided not to eat. I might have even left 
work earlier, because one of the employees had birthday and would certainly treat me with a 
piece. 
Eventually, I finished up eating a cake. Actually, it would be a great excuse to say: this 
was an impulse, I couldn't control it. Yet we feel this action as consciously willed, maybe 
irrational and hasty, but still – willed or rather “weak-willed”. It might be the case that will is 
just an illusion (as in fact the experience of casual agency of will might be an illusion at all; 
Wegner,  2002).  The  true  motivation  can  be,  and  surely  to  some  extent  is,  unconscious. 
Therefore, for a while I will leave the notion of will and try to explain akrasia using the idea 8 
of motivation, suggesting that there is a process which propels the somehow self-defeating 
behavior. 
 
2. George Ainslie 
How is it possible that if we judge a certain option better – we still choose to do something 
else? Utility theorists would suggest that we weigh benefits and losses and choose the option 
we consider the best.  Maybe the answer would be that on the spur of the moment we judged 
certain option higher than the one we judged better all things considered. Again, however, 
how is this possible? 
Some other operationalizations of the problem can be found in Freud who differentiated 
between two types of motivational processes:  one that serves serve long-range goals (the 
“reality principle”) and one that serve short-range ones (the “pleasure principle”) (Ainslie, 
2001).  Some  psychologists  define  impulsiveness  as  the  preference  for  smaller  but  earlier 
rewards over larger but later rewards. A qualified form of impulsiveness would be also an 
inability to wait for delayed rewards (ibidem). 
It is important to notice the intuition that we value certain reward higher now than we 
would value when delayed temporarily. We value the reward of 100 USD higher now than we 
would value the same reward today, knowing that we will receive it a year later. Simply, in 
the former option, we could invest our 100 USD and have 120 USD in a year. This is why we 
may temporarily discount the value of a future reward. 
To put it more precisely – imagine that drinking a bottle of vodka is worth for you 10 
utiles. You also have a discount rate of 10% a day. This means that drinking a bottle of vodka 
tomorrow is worth for you: 10*90%=9 utiles today; drinking a bottle of vodka in two days: 
10*90%*90%= 8,1 utiles etc. On the other hand, drinking vodka usually means hangover the 
next day, costing you, let's say, 11 utiles, with a similar discount rate of 10%. This means that 
having hangover tomorrow entails the cost of 11*90%=9,9 today and had the cost of 8,91 
yesterday. This means that if today we have Saturday, you will drink (reward=10; cost=9,9) if 
you  had  to  make  this  decision  on  Friday  (about  Saturday),  you  would  decide  the  same 
(reward=9; cost=8,91). This is exponential discounting. It is described by the formula: 
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  value = objective value * (1 − Discount rate)
Delay (Ainslie, 2001) 
 
 
picture 1. Exponential discounting; y – value; x – reward delay 
 
It  should  be  differentiated  from  hyperbolic  discounting,  caught  by  the  following  formula 
(Mazur, 1987 [in: Ainslie, 2001] ) 
 
  value = amount / (constant1 + (constant2 * delay)) 
  where constants are usually close to 1 
 
 
picture 2. Hyperbolic discounting; y – value; x – reward delay 
   
As one can see hyperbolic curve is similar to the exponential curve in a way that rewards at 
both very short and very long delays would be valued the same in both. However, rewards in 10 
between would be valued less in a case of hyperbolic comparing to exponential one
4. This is 
because the former is more “bowed” than the latter. 
It is quite easy to notice that exponential discounting “wins” against hyperbolic one. As 
G. Ainslie puts it  
 
“Ms. Exponential could buy Ms. Hyperbolic’s winter coat cheaply every spring, for instance, 
because the distance to the next winter would depress Ms. H’s valuation of it more than Ms. E’s. 
Ms. E could then sell the coat back to Ms. H every fall when the approach of winter sent Ms. H’s 
valuation of it into a high spike.” 
 
To  avoid  exploitation  by  someone  who  discounts  exponentially,  one  should  discount 
exponentially as well. This suggests that e.g. natural selection would “prefer” exponential 
discounting over hyperbolic one. Within economy it is also widely perceived that the most 
rational way of discounting goods would be an exponential curve (Załuski, 2006).    
A  very  interesting  observation  is,  however,  that  people  (as  well  as  animals  like  e.g. 
pigeons) do not  follow  exponential  curve in their everyday  decision-making. They  rather 
discount  according to  hyperbolic curve  – an observation proved to  be true in  a series  of 
empirical studies (see e.g. Mazur, 2001 or Ainslie, 1992
5). This is rather a surprising finding, 
especially if we consider natural selection
6. 
However, hyperbolic discounting explains perfectly the phenomenon of  akrasia – self-
defeating behavior. Take a look at this graph: 
 
 
picture 3. Hyperbolic discounting – long-term and short-term rewards; y – value; x – reward delay. 
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As one can see – in case of hyperbolic discounting, you may value certain long-term reward 
higher for most of the time (if delay is long enough), but eventually go for a short-term 
reward if the delay is shorter. To give an example, you generally would assign higher value 
for staying sober – but only if there is no close opportunity to drink. When e.g. you are at the 
party – and the delay of the “being drunk” reward is close enough – you will drink. In fact, 
you may truly intend (and will) not to drink in a long term – and, when the opportunity 
beckons – you will “change you mind” and truly intend (and will) to drink. This is what utility 
theory would not predict – but still this comes from weighing rewards and losses, only the 
discount curve is hyperbolic instead of exponential. 
 
IV. Consequences 
Davidson, as I have point it out already, proved that akrasia it logically possible. Yet, it does 
not  mean  that  it  must  exist.  Of  course,  we  seem  to  experience  akrasia  quite  often 
(procrastination, impulsive behavior etc.) - but this might be an illusion (e.g. we might have 
intended to drink in the first place). “Discovery” of hyperbolic discount curve is, however, an 
empirical prove that akrasia not only exists but is  quite a frequent phenomenon
7.  
Important consequences of this approach to weak -willed actions were discussed in the 
fields like e.g. substance abuse (e.g. Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003b), decision making and 
game theory (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003a). Also in  philosophy of law some attention was 
given to the notion of weak-willed actions. Now, I want to discuss some of them: 
 
1.  Economic  Analysis  of  Law.  This  approach,  built  on  the  utility  theory  assumptions 
suggests that human is a rational  homo oeconomicus. However, discounting future 
hyperbolically shows an “imperfection” of human nature. An agent who discounts 
hyperobolically  (rather  than  exponentially)  is  an  irrational  agent  (Załuski,  2006). 
Namely,  possibility  of  akrasia  as  an  irrational  self-defeating  behavior  (Davidson, 
1970) and its occurrence is a strong argument against economic analysis of law. 
2.  Business (Commercial) Law. If a man is an irrational (or rather not fully rational) 
being – than limiting economical liberalism would in fact maximize expected income. 
Models  in  economy  built  on  exponential  discounting  win  against  those  built  on 
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frequently observed, we tend to “predict” our future fails due to some more or less expected appetites. This is 
why it may seem as if we treated our “future self”as a separate agent and try to trick ourselves not to give any 
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expect alcohol will be present if we at this particular moment intend not to drink (Ainslie, 2001). Consequences 
for the philosophy and psychology of self are, however, not be discussed further in this article. 12 
hyperbolic discounting (are more effective). In fact, when a human being becomes 
aware of the values and delays between rewards – she may start to use exponential 
discount curve (Ainslie, 2001). This suggest that a human being is capable, if only 
“conscious”  enough,  of  maximizing  her  expected  income.  However,  in  most  of 
everyday  situations  we  would  automatically  use  hyperbolic  curve,  therefore,  some 
limitations to free market should be justified. 
3.  Responsibility. So far, all given examples of akrasia were those rather funny, harmless 
acts  of procrastination, not  following one's  diet or drinking alcohol despite earlier 
promises like “it won't happen again”. However, everything I have already written 
about  akrasia  applies to  all kinds of impulsive  behavior.  Including breaking legal  
rules. There are two distinct areas of special interest for law theorists or philosophers:  
a)  How, practically speaking, are legal rules used by those expected to adhere to 
them? Awareness of the fact that people tend to discount future hyperbolically and 
act on the basis of so discounted reward value helps to understand human nature 
and to design  legal rules more efficiently. In fact, a guideline ought to be followed 
- to ask every time a rule is created: what sanction would motivate in the long term 
strong enough so that it would minimize the possibility of impulsive acts against 
the  norm  if  the  values  of  obeying  and  disobeying  the  norm  are  discounted 
hyperbolically.  
b)  To what extent can one be held responsible for disobeying a given rule. Do we 
disobey rules willingly? 
 
The  problem  here  arises  because  we  define  acratic  actions  (sensu  stricto)  as  free  and 
intentional, yet we claim that one acts acraticaly (impulsively) because one discounts future 
hyperbolically (which indeed is a part of human nature). The question is  – could I avoid 
acting  impulsively  (which  might  have  resulted  in  breaking  a  legal  rule)?  If  following 
hyperbolic discount curve and acting on the basis of the intention to do what one values the 
highest in this particular moment is how we are “constructed”, is a part of being a human – 
how can we treat these impulsive acts as free? We have usually a little control of what we are 
prone to and which appetites we find seductive as well. 
Nevertheless, we perceive acratic actions as free and intentional ourselves. A murderer might 
have never intended to kill his victim. Except for the moment he did so. And he may truly 
regret it afterwards. Yet, he feels that on the spur of the moment his action was free and 
intentional and he knew he was breaking a certain rule. How can we reconcile an intuition 13 
(obvious even for the murderer himself) that he is responsible for what has happened with the 
realization that he in fact could not resist what he did? 
 
I suggest two possible answers to this riddle: 
 
1.  The murderer (or anyone) could predict he is impulsive and avoid situations that 
could instigate him to fail to obey rules – moral and legal
8 (killing is forbidden).  
Just like in a situation when I know that I am prone to smell of a cake and I try to 
avoid candy-stores when I am on a diet. 
 
This suggests that a given person should treat herself as two temporally separate agents  – 
present one – intending not to break a norm and the future one – that will intend to break the 
norm if only given such opportunity. A person can always avoid appetites if  she knows they 
are difficult  to resist. Two problems, however, arise with this solution: 
 
a)  We cannot know that we are prone to something before an opportunity is given  
to experience this proneness; 
b)  Even  if  such  a  proneness  is  predictable  for  an  agent,  occurrence  of  these 
appetites – sometimes is not. But even if appetites occur suddenly – we still 
may perceive our actions as free and intentional and feel responsible. 
 
2.  Experience  of  casual  agency  of  free  will  is  just  an  illusion  (Wegner,  2002). 
Experience of will might be just an illusion or a subjective feeling of self-control 
which connects thought with action (ibidem). In this case “decision” to murder 
was  in  fact  somehow  “mechanic”.  This  would  mean  that  our  intuition  of 
responsibility does not need casual free will – just the illusional experience of it. 
The only problem with this solution is that describing experience of casual free 
will as illusional might be counterinuitive itself.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8 Rule of law may be treated here as sanction “amplifier”. Disobeying moral rule will mean in the given example 
disobeying legal rule as well – avoiding this “double” sanction is very rewarding even in a long term. Of course, 
some rules can have moral sanctions only, some legal sanctions only. 14 
V. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to discuss akrasia or weak-willed actions from philosophical and 
psychological points of view and show consequences of  akrasia for philosophy of law.  The 
following conclusion can be drawn.  
 
1. Akrasia  sensu  stricto  is  defined  as  a  phenomenon  when  one  acts  free  and 
intentionally against one’s better judgment. 
2. Our everyday experience suggests that akrasia is not only possible but it is quite a 
common phenomenon, usually observed in the form of e.g. procrastination.  
3. Psychologically,  akrasia  can  be  explained  by  the  observation  that  we  tend  to 
discount future hyperbolically – what is well proved empirically.  
4. This might be rather surprising as exponential discounting is much more effective 
and can be considered rational, whereas hyperbolic discounting – irrational (or at 
least not fully rational). 
5. This has some interesting consequences for philosophy of law. Three of them were 
discussed, namely: 
  Economic analysis of law is wrong in that it presupposes that we are rational and 
discount exponentially 
  Business law should limit free market if it is aiming at maximizing expected 
income 
  Existence of akrasia may suggest that to keep the intuition of responsibility for 
disobeying legal rules the notion of free will as a casual agent is dispensable and 
difficult to maintain. It can be argued that it is an illusional subjective experience 
for connecting thought with action. 
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